The paper provides an argument for the thesis that an agent's degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. This Consistency Argument is based on the Consistency Theorem. The latter says that an agent's belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed i her degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms and are updated according to the ranktheoretic update rules.
Introduction
In his (1998) James Joyce provides an epistemic vindication of the thesis that an agent's degrees of belief should obey the probability calculus in the sense that her degree of belief function be non-negative, normalized, and nitely additive. Rather than the supposedly pragmatic vindication provided by a Dutch Book Argument, he aims at a genuine non-pragmatic vindication of probabilism. Joyce's argument is based on the assumption that an agent's degree of belief function is epistemically defective if there exists another degree of belief function which is more accurate in each possible world. Accuracy of an agent's degree of belief in a proposition A at some possible world ω is identied with the distance between the agent's degree of belief in A and the truth value of A in ω (1 for true, 0 for false).
Apart from some more technical objections pertaining to the way distance is measured (Maher 2002) , there are the following alleged problems with Joyce's argument. For one, Joyce's conditions on measures of inaccuracy do not determine a single measure, but a whole set of such measures. This in itself would rather strengthen than weaken Joyce's argument, were it not for the fact that these measures dier in their recommendations as to which alternative degree of belief function an incoherent degree of belief function should be replaced by. All measures of inaccuracy agree that an incoherent agent whose degree of belief function violates the probability axioms should adopt another coherent degree of belief function which is more Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson F. Huber accurate in each possible world. However, these measures may dier in their recommendation as to which particular coherent degree of belief function the agent should adopt. In fact, for each possible world, following the recommendation of one measure will leave the agent o less accurate according to some other measure. Bronfman's objection questions the normative force of Joyce's argument on the basis of this fact. Why should I move from my incoherent degree of belief function to a coherent one, if my advisors, though agreeing that I should move, all disagree as to where I should move. In Joyce's terms (slightly adapted), suppose for each American city there is a more beautiful Australian city. I live in Pasadena, and according to any reasonable index of beauty there is some Australian city which is more beautiful than Pasadena according to this index. The big city close to the sea index says I should move to Melbourne or Sydney (but not to Canberra). The clean air index recommends moving to Canberra (but not to Melbourne or Sydney). And so on. Why should I move to Australia when all these standards disagree on where in Australia I should go, even if they all agree I should go somewhere in Australia? See Bronfman (manuscript) .
Then there is the intuition that it is better to be accurate in the actual world, possibly at the cost of being incoherent and inaccurate on average, than to be coherent and accurate on average, but inaccurate in the actual world . Hájek's objection says that a rational agent will prefer to have a low rather than high degree of belief in the proposition that it is safe to jump from the Eiel Tower, even if this comes at the cost of having an incoherent degree of belief function. See Hájek (to appear).
Moreover, it turns out that Joyce's theorem depends on representing true' by 1 and`false' by 0, and is false if`true' is represented by 0 and false' by 1. Howson's objection is that Joyce's theorem has no epistemic signicance insofar as it is not a result about truth, but only a result about distributions ω of 1s and 0s over propositions A, B in some eld which satisfy ω (A) ∈ {0, 1}, ω A = 1−ω (A), and ω (A ∩ B) = ω (A)·ω (B). See Howson (manuscript). I am not convinced by these objections. Bronfman's objection is nothing but a plea to further narrow down the class of inaccuracy measures. Suppose with Andy Egan (slightly adapted) that all moral theories agree that rich countries should help poor countries, but they all disagree as to how to help. One moral theory says rich countries should ship food to poor countries rather than importing food from them (in order for them to have enough food). Another moral theory says rich countries should import food from poor countries rather than shipping food to them (in order to strengthen their economy). That does not imply that rich countries need not help poor countries after all.
Hájek's objection neglects that the counterintuitive character of the above example depends on our low degree of belief that jumping from the Eiel Tower is safe. It is true that the actual world has a privileged status. But we do not know which world is actual. All we have are our degrees of belief. If you are condent that jumping from the Eiel Tower is not safe, your expected inaccuracy will take this bias into account. The expected inaccuracy (in the sense of an inaccuracy measure I) of a degree of belief function B is given by ω∈W I (B, ω) · Bel (ω). Bel is your actual degree of belief function on the nite set of possibilities W , and I (B, ω) is the inaccuracy of B in the world ω. Joyce considers the inaccuracy I (B, ω) in each world ω ∈ W and so assumes all worlds to be on a par as far as inaccuracy is concerned. Trivially, Joyce's theorem remains a theorem if`expected inaccuracy' is substituted for inaccuracy in each possible world', provided the actual belief function Bel assigns a positive degree of belief to at least one world. So although Joyce's original argument may be subject to Hájek's objection, the substitute in terms of expected inaccuracy is not.
Howson's objection nally locates the assumption of representing`true' by 1 and`false' by 0 in Joyce's conditions on measures of inaccuracy. But it is the probability axioms themselves that adopt this assumption. This is seen in the normalization axiom that requires the probability for the whole set of possibilities (the tautology) to be 1. Joyce's theorem is true for the bundle consisting of the probability axioms and the labelling convention to represent true' by 1 and`false' by 0. It is also true for a dual of the probability axioms (Pr (A) ≤ 1, Pr (W ) = 0, and Pr (A ∩ B) = Pr (A) + Pr (B) if A ∪ B = W ) and the dual convention of representing`true' by 0 and`false' by 1.
But why all this ado about accuracy when there already exists a vindication of probabilism? The desire for an epistemic vindication seems to have arisen out of the shortcomings of the pragmatic nature of the Dutch Book Argument and the apparently not completely successful eorts to depragmatize the latter (Armendt 1993 , Christensen 1996 , Howson and Franklin 1994 , Skyrms 1984 , Ramsey 1926 ). On my preferred reading, these depragmatiza-According to Colin Howson (personal correspondence), the probability axioms make no assumption concerning the numerical representation of truth values, because they do not mention truth or falsity. They only mention logical truth and logical falsity, and the numbers 1 and 0 assigned these are interpretable in ways that have nothing to do with truth or falsity (e.g. as innite odds).
On a slightly dierent note, I do not know of a way to x things if`true' is represented by +∞ and`false' by −∞. tion eorts are based on a distinction between degrees of belief on the one hand and fair betting ratios on the other, and the idea that degrees of belief for propositions are (measured by) evaluations of fair betting ratios for these propositions. Violating the probability axioms then does not only result in the pragmatic defect of being vulnerable to a sure loss. First and foremost it is the epistemic defect of being inconsistent in one's evaluations of fair betting ratios.
Yet inconsistent evaluations of fair betting ratios for various propositions, while being inconsistencies, are not inconsistent beliefs in those propositions. Indeed, unless degrees of belief give rise to qualitative yes-or-no beliefs, it is a category mistake to say that incoherent degrees of belief for propositions amount to inconsistent beliefs in those propositions. Inconsistency is only well dened for propositions or sentences . Coherent degrees of belief do not give rise to consistent and deductively closed beliefs, at least if belief is degree of belief to some degree. The impossibility result in question is, of course, the well known lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961 , Hempel 1962 .
Given this background the epistemic vindication of a normative theory of epistemic states, such as subjective probability theory, seems to be something along the following lines. An agent's epistemic states should obey such and such axioms, because the set of her beliefs based on these epistemic states is consistent and deductively closed just in case her epistemic states satisfy the axioms in questions. The requirements of consistency and deductive closure can already be found in Hintikka (1962) , and have become the dening properties of a belief set. Obviously, for such a justication to work, epistemic states and the axioms governing them must give rise to a notion of belief. But not only subjective probabilities do not do this. The same holds true for Dempster-Shafer belief functions (Dempster 1968 , Shafer 1976 ) as well as plausibility measures (Halpern 2003 ). !
Ranking Functions
Hence, the rst question is whether there is a representation of epistemic states that gives rise to a notion of qualitative yes-or-no belief. Fortunately I have to add a qualication due to Colin Howson (personal correspondence). Smullyan ! If possibility theory (Zadeh 1978 , Dubois & Prade 1988 ) is interpreted in terms of uncertainty rather than imprecision, one can dene a notion of belief (positive degree of necessity) that is consistent and deductively closed in the nite, though not in the countable sense. there is: ranking theory (Spohn 1988; 1990 ; to appear; manuscript). A function from a eld of propositions A over a set of possibilities W into the set of natural numbers N enriched by ∞, : A → N ∪ {∞}, is a (nitely minimitive) ranking function on A i for all A, B ∈ A,
A ranking function on a σ-eld / complete eld A is countably / completely minimitive i for all countable / uncountable B ⊆ A, 
For α ∈ L, the conditional ranking (· | α) : L \ {β ∈ L :|= ¬β} → N ∪ {∞} based on the ranking (·) : L → N ∪ {∞} is dened as
Again, stipulating (β | α) = ∞ if |= ¬β guarantees that (· | α) is a ranking on L for every α ∈ L. is regular i (α) < (¬ ) for all consistent α ∈ L. 
The converse is not true. For the relation between ranking functions on a eld of propositions and pointwise ranking functions on a set of possibilities one level below see Huber (2006) . A probability measure Pr : A → {0} ∪ (0, 1] can be epistemically interpreted as an agent's degree of belief function. It has the following properties.
• Pr (W ) = 1 and Pr (∅) = 0
The last clauses are unrestrictedly dened if we stipulate Pr (B | A) = 1 for Pr (A) = 0. Countable additivity is assumed for the countably innite versions. Let us replace 1 by 0, 0 by ∞, > by <, + and by min, · and by + and , and ÷ by −, as well as neglect the exclusiveness condition for summations. Then we get the corresponding properties of a ranking function : A → N ∪ {∞}, which can be epistemically interpreted as an agent's degree of disbelief function. For all A, B,
Countable minimitivity is assumed for the countably innite versions. It is useful to keep this translational device in mind, even though it is no more than that. A ranking function over A is interpreted as an agent's degree of disbelief function for the propositions in A. (A) is the agent's degree of disbelief for A. It tells us how reluctant she is to give up her qualitative disbelief in A.
A is the agent's degree of disbelief for A. It tells us how reluctant she is to give up her qualitative disbelief in A. This will become important below.
The belief function β (·) : A → {−∞} ∪ Z ∪ {∞} associated with the ranking function (·) : A → N ∪ {∞} is dened as β (·) = (·) − (·). The corresponding function in probability theory is Be (·) = Pr (·) ÷ Pr (·). Be is, for instance, used in Bayesian conrmation theory, where Milne (1996) argues that r = log [Pr (H | E) ÷ Pr (H)] is the one true measure of conrmation, whereas Fitelson (1999) 
A ranking function on a eld A induces a set of propositions Bel ⊆ A, 's belief set :
The belief set Bel is the set of all propositions or sentences whose complements or negations the agent disbelieves to some positive degree. Alternatively we can say that an agent's belief set is the set of all propositions she believes to some positive degree, since Bel = {A ∈ A : β (A) > 0}, where β is the belief function associated with . Note that one and the same belief set may be induced by many dierent ranking functions.
The Consistency Argument
The second question is whether something along the following lines is true. A degree of disbelief function satises the ranking axioms i the corresponding belief set is consistent and deductively closed. The theorem in the next section states something along these lines. Let us rst get clear about the structure of the argument for the thesis that an agent's degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus.
A (depragmatized) Dutch Book Argument is supposed to vindicate probabilism, the thesis that an agent's degrees of belief should obey the probability calculus. It has the following ingredients. 0. (Fair) betting ratios.
A link between degrees of belief and (fair) betting ratios. Sometimes
degrees of belief are dened as (fair) betting ratios. Then this link is F. Huber identity. Sometimes degrees of belief are measured by (fair) betting ratios.
Then this link is weaker than identity. In the latter case we are facing the connection problem, the question of how degrees of belief and (fair) betting ratios are related to each other.
2. The (depragmatized) Dutch Book Principle. It says that it is pragmatically (epistemically) defective to accept a series of bets which guarantees a sure loss, i.e. a Dutch Book (to consider a Dutch Book to be fair). 3. The (depragmatized) Dutch Book Theorem. It says that an agent's (fair) betting ratios obey the probability calculus i the agent never accepts a Dutch Book (never considers a Dutch Book to be fair).
A conclusion: it is pragmatically (epistemically) defective to have degrees
of belief that violate the probability axioms.
A (depragmatized) Dutch Book Argument is an argument with premises 1-3 and conclusion 4. Particular arguments dier from each other by the exact form the above ingredients take. Obviously, if we strengthen the link between degrees of belief and (fair) betting ratios we have less of a problem in getting from 2 and 3 to 4, but we have more problems in making 1 plausible. There are many objections to the vindication of probabilism by a Dutch Book Argument (Hájek 2005 ; to appear). For instance, Dutch-Book-ability is a mere possibility, often far from the agent being actually Dutch-Book-ed. The corresponding feature is shared by the Consistency Argument. However, the purpose of this is not to rigorously discuss Dutch Book Arguments. The aim is to name the components of the argument, and the role they play therein, in order to motivate the corresponding argument for the ranking thesis that an agent's degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking axioms. I do, however, want to draw the reader's attention to one point: the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic defectiveness, or practical and theoretical rationality, most famously discussed by Kant (1902) , but also present in other areas of formal epistemology (Rott 2001) .
What are the corresponding ingredients in the Consistency Argument? Clearly, ranks play the role of probabilities, and the Consistency Theorem of the next section will be the substitute for the Dutch Book Theorem. The conclusion will be that it is epistemically defective to have degrees of disbelief that violate the ranking axioms. The two ingredients diering in important ways are the substitutes for (fair) betting ratios and the Dutch Book Principle. These are, respectively, degrees of entrenchment and a principle of theoretical rationality saying that it is epistemically defective to have beliefs that are not both consistent and deductively closed.
The idea that ranks can be measured by the agent's contraction behavior is developed in Spohn (1999) , although in Spohn (to appear) Matthias Hild is said to have presented it rst and independently. Spohn (manuscript) presents three methods for the measurement of ranks. I will only use what he calls the method of enhancements. To give the reader an idea of how this measurement works, suppose I disbelieve that Sacramento is the capital of California, S ∈ Bel F ranz . Then my rank for S, F ranz (S), can be measured as follows. We put me on a busy street, say Sunset Boulevard on a Saturday night, and count the number of people who pass by and tell me that Sacramento is the capital of California. My rank for S equals n precisely if I stop disbelieving S after exactly n people have passed by and told me S. So F ranz (S) is measured by the number of independent and minimally positively reliable information sources saying S that it takes for me to give up my disbelief in S. If I do not disbelieve S to begin with, my rank for S is 0.
The relation between degrees of disbelief and degrees of entrenchment is a delicate one, much like the relation between degrees of belief and (fair) betting ratios. One option is to take the former as primitive (Eriksson & Hájek to appear), and to say that the latter measure them under suitable conditions. Another option is to go hypothetical: my degrees of disbelief are the degrees of entrenchment that I would have if there were an innite stock of independent and minimally positively reliable information sources at my disposal. I think the second option is attractive, and more attractive than its probabilistic counterpart. It is most attractive if we base it on a ranktheoretic theory of counterfactuals. The prospects for such an account are good: a ranking function for each world replaces the selection functions of Stalnaker (1968) or the similarity ordering of Lewis (1973) . The ranking function of a world is objectively interpreted as the ranktheoretic analogue of chance in a world in probability theory or similarity with respect to a world in the theory of counterfactuals.
Here is the plan for the rest of the paper. The next section states the Consistency Theorem which says that an agent's degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms i the agent's belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed, provided updating leads from one ranking function to another. Section 5 reformulates this in terms of conditional consistency. Section 6 presents various probabilistic and ranktheoretic update rules. Section 7 contains the consistency theorems for these, thus vindicating the proviso that updating leads from one ranking function to another. I will conclude in section 8.
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The Consistency Theorem
An agent's degree of entrenchment for a proposition A is dened as the number of independent and minimally positively (mp), and hence equally, reliable information sources saying A that it takes for the agent to give up her disbelief that A. If the agent does not disbelieve A to begin with, it does not take any information source saying A to make her stop disbelieving A. So her degree of entrenchment for A is 0. If no nite number of information sources is able to make an agent stop disbelieving A, her degree of entrenchment for A is ∞. To receive the information A is, among others, to also receive the information B, for any proposition B ⊇ A. To independently and mp-reliably receive n times the information A is, among others, to independently and mpreliably receive n times the information B ⊇ A. It is not to independently and mp-reliably receive m times the information B, for some m = n. The reason is that the number n characterizes the reliability of the information source saying A. That source is the same for any logical consequence of A.
If you tell me that the temperature today at noon will be 93 • Fahrenheit, you also tell me that the temperature today at noon will be between 90 • and 96 • Fahrenheit. But it is still you who tells me so. Therefore the reliability with which I get the second information is exactly the same as the reliability with which I get the rst information. The dierence between the two is a dierence in content. This will become important in the proof of the Consistency Theorem (3.2 below). When we measure ranks we count information sources. For the measurement to work, these have to be independent and mp-reliable. Of course, one person's saying A will sometimes make somebody stop disbelieving A, while the sermons of twenty others won't. And my father's telling me A after my mother has already explained to me why A won't make much of dierence for me either. What's new? Neither are my (fair) betting ratios always independent of the truth values of the propositions I am betting on, nor are they never aected by the stakes at issue. The operational surrogate is not the theoretical entity itself. Often it does not even provide a good measurement.
The agent's belief set at a given time is the set of propositions whose complements she disbelieves according to her entrenchment function. An agent's entrenchment function on L is a ranking on L i every possible current or future belief set Bel ⊆ L based on is consistent and deductively closed. Updating is temporarily assumed to lead from one ranking on L to another ranking on L.
An agent's entrenchment function on A is a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function on A i every possible current or future belief set Bel ⊆ A based on is consistent and deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. Updating is temporarily assumed to lead from one nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function on A to another nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function on A.
Degrees of entrenchment are assumed to be numbers from N ∪ {∞}.
Proof. ⇒: Let A be a eld of propositions over the set of possibilities W .
Suppose an agent's entrenchment function on A is a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function. By denition, Bel = A ∈ A : A > 0 . Finite / countable / complete minimitivity yields for each nite / countable / uncountable B ⊆ Bel ,
Hence B neg = ( B) = 0, and so B = ∅. Thus Bel is consistent in the nite / countable / complete sense.
Furthermore, let B ⊆ Bel be nite / countable / uncountable, and suppose B ⊆ A for some A ∈ A. We have to show that A ∈ Bel , i.e. A > 0. By nite / countable / complete minimitivity, min B : B ∈ B = ( B neg ) > 0. So A > 0, because A ⊆ B neg and is monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. Hence Bel is deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. Similarly for a ranking on a language L. Note, though, that compactness, which has been built into the denitions of consistency and deductive closure, is needed. Otherwise we face the problem that Γ and Γ are not dened for innite Γ ⊆ L.
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As this holds true for any ranking function, the belief set Bel + of any possible future entrenchment function + is also consistent and deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense, provided updating leads from one nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function to another nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function. Gärdenfors & Rott (1995: 37) call this the principle of categorical matching " , and (subject to cosmetic adjustments in the case of Shenoy revision) it is true for all ranktheoretic update rules considered in section 6. ⇐: Let A be a eld of propositions over the set of possibilities W , and let be an agent's entrenchment function on A.
(1) Suppose (W ) > 0. Then ∅ ∈ A ∈ A : A > 0 = Bel , and so B = ∅ for at least one nite B ⊆ Bel . Thus, Bel is nitely, countably, and completely inconsistent. Similarly for a ranking on a language L.
(2) Suppose next (∅) < ∞. Assume the agent receives evidence equivalent to being told ∅ by n or more independent and mp-reliable information sources. By the denition of degrees of entrenchment, the resulting entrenchment function n after independently and mp-reliably receiving n or more times the information ∅ is such that n (∅) = 0. Therefore W ∈ A ∈ A : n A > 0 = Bel n . As B ⊆ W for each B ⊆ Bel n , Bel n is not deductively closed in the nite, countable, or complete sense. Similarly for a ranking on a language L. 
which means that Bel is not deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. If ( B) = n > 0, we have the following situation: |-|| 0 ( B) = n min { (A) : A ∈ B} = n > n Assume the agent receives evidence equivalent to being told B by at least n, but fewer than n independent and mp-reliable information sources. The resulting entrenchment function n * after independently and mp-reliably receiving n * ∈ [n, n ) times the information B is such that n * ( B) = 0. Now even if for all A ∈ Bel , n * (A) = (A) − n * > 0, we have the following situation: ||
which means that Bel n * is not deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. Similarly for a ranking on a language L.
which means that Bel is not deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. If min { (A) : A ∈ B} = (A * ) = n > 0, for some A * ∈ B, we have the following situation:
= n > n Assume the agent receives evidence equivalent to being told A * by at least n, but fewer than n independent and mp-reliable information sources. The resulting entrenchment function n * after independently and mp-reliably receiving n * ∈ [n, n ) times the information A * is such that n * (A * ) = 0. Now n * ( B) ≥ ( B) − n * > 0, and so we have the following situation: ||-
which means that Bel n is not deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. Similarly for a ranking on a language L.
As it is obvious how to extend the following to rankings on languages L, these are not considered anymore.
The Consistency Theorem Reformulated
Observe with Spohn (to appear) Observation 5.1 (Spohn's Observation). Let A be a eld over the set of possibilities W , and let be a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function on A with (· | ·) as its conditional ranking function.
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Then we have for all nite / countable / uncountable B ⊆ A with B = ∅,
and for all A, B ∈ A with B = ∅,
Conversely, let (· | ·) : A × A → N ∪ {∞} and be functions with these properties. Then is a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function on A with (· | ·) as its conditional ranking function, i.e. for all nite / countable / uncountable B ⊆ A,
Proof. ⇐: The rst equation is called conditional consistency. We get it from minimitivity and the denition of conditional ranking functions. The assumption that B = ∅ enters in the last step. As every ranking function, a conditional ranking function (· | E) induces a belief set Bel (·|E) . Bel (·|E) is called a conditional belief set of , viz. 's belief set conditional on E. So 's belief set is its belief set conditional on W , Bel = Bel (·|W ) . {W } is 's belief set conditional on any E ∈ A with (E) = ∞, including the empty set ∅. Thus, rather than believing everything conditional on a proposition that she thinks is impossible, an epistemic agent refrains from believing anything except the tautology in such a case. If one holds that even this is believing too much given a (supposedly) contradictory condition, one can resort to one of the following two options. Either one sticks to (A | ∅) = 0 for all A including ∅ ( (A | B) = 0 for all A including ∅, and B with (B) = ∞) and takes the empty set as the resulting belief set; or one restricts (· | E) to non-empty E (or to E with a nite rank). Note, though, that the empty set is not deductively closed; and the function assigning 0 to all propositions including the empty set is not a ranking function. The reformulation of ranking functions turns the conditional consistency theorem into a triviality. However, a lot is hidden in the assumptions, which are not covered by the consistency vindication.
First, it is not clear how to vindicate (A | W ) = (A) for all A ∈ A by a consistency argument, because it concerns the relation of two dierent functions. There is relief insofar as this assumption can be replaced by the condition that (W ) = 0. As we have seen in the proof of the rst theorem, the latter condition can be vindicated by a consistency argument. But a formulation of ranking functions purely in terms of restrictions on the conditional functions, and a denitional link between conditional and unconditional ranking functions as above would be preferable.
Second, as in the denition of conditional ranking functions, we have to assume (∅ | A) = ∞.
The third assumption gives most content to the link between conditional and unconditional ranking functions: (B | A) = (B ∩ A) − (A). Together with conditional consistency it entails the monotonicity of unconditional ranking functions w.r.t. set inclusion,
This in turn is equivalent to half of the minimitivity condition, viz.
As in the consistency theorem I have assumed that conditional, and hence unconditional, degrees of entrenchment take values from N ∪ {∞}. Together with the denitional link between conditional and unconditional entrenchment functions, this also entails the monotonicity w.r.t. set inclusion of ranking functions. There is a nal worry about the vindication of the ranking thesis in terms of conditional consistency. It does not carry over to update rules.
Conditionalization and Revision
If evidence comes in form of a proposition only, probabilism is extended by Update Rule 6.1 (Strict Conditionalization). If Pr (·) : A → is your subjective probability measure at time t and between t and t you become certain of E ∈ A and no logically stronger proposition, then your subjective probability measure at time t should be Pr E (·) : A → ,
Note that strict conditionalization does not satisfy the principle of categorical matching. If Pr (E) = 0, then Pr (· | E) is not dened. Even for regular Pr, and even if E is assumed to be non-empty, strict conditionalization does not strictly satisfy the principle of categorical matching. Pr (· | E) is not regular when Pr is, but only regular conditional on E, i.e. such that
The corresponding update rule in ranking theory is Update Rule Plain conditionalization satises the principle of categorical matching and leads from one ranking function to another ranking function. As with strict conditionalization, regular ranking functions are only turned into conditionally regular ranking functions.
Jerey's insight is that evidence usually does not come in form of a proposition only. Strictly speaking, we (almost) never become certain of a proposition. Rather, evidence is such that it changes our degrees of belief for the propositions of a partition of the set of possibilities. In this case probabilism is extended by Update Rule 6.3 (Jerey Conditionalization). If Pr (·) : A → is your subjective probability measure at time t and between t and t your subjective probabilities on the partition {E i ∈ A : i ∈ I} change to p i ∈ [0, 1] with i p i = 1 (p i = 0 for Pr (E i ) = 0 and p i = 1 for Pr (E i ) = 1), and your positive subjective probabilities change on no ner partition, then your subjective probability measure at time t should be Pr E i →p i (·) : A → ,
See Jerey (1983) . As dictated by the translational device from section 2, the ranktheoretic analogue is Update Rule 6.4 (Spohn Conditionalization). If (·) : A → N ∪ {∞} is your ranking function at time t and between t and t your ranks on the partition {E i ∈ A : i ∈ I} change to n i ∈ N ∪ {∞} with min i {n i } = 0 (n i = ∞ for E i = ∅ and n i = 0 for E i = W ), and your nite ranks change on no ner partition, then your ranking function at time t should be E i →n i (·) :
As the reader will have noticed, Spohn conditionalization is more general than Jerey conditionalization in two respects. First, the parameters n i are required to be 0 and ∞ only for W and ∅, respectively, whereas the parameters p i are required to be 1 and 0 for all E i (not only W and ∅) with Pr (E i ) = 1 and Pr (E i ) = 0, respectively. Second, in the probabilistic case the indices i range de facto over the natural numbers N , because there can only be countable many positive parameters p i (otherwise i p i > 1). In the ranktheoretic case the condition min i {n i } = 0 does not impose such a restriction.
It is important to note that the parameters p i and n i characterize the agent's posterior degree of belief and disbelief in the E i , respectively. They do not characterize the evidential impact on the agent's epistemic state of what happens between t and t . Jerey and Spohn conditionalization focus on the result of the update process. Therefore Pr E i →p i (E i ) = p i and E i →n i (E i ) = n i . In this sense they do not characterize the evidence as such. Rather, they characterize the result at time t of the interaction between the prior degree of (dis)belief function at time t and the evidence received between t and t .
Jerey's suggestion is that evidence might even come in form of a new degree of belief function over a subeld of the original eld of propositions. In this case probabilism is extended by Update Rule 6.5 (Jerey Revision). If Pr (·) : A → is your subjective probability measure at time t and between t and t your subjective probability measure on the eld E ⊆ A changes to Pr (·) : E → (Pr (E) = Pr (E) if Pr (E) ∈ {0, 1}), and the positive part of your subjective probability measure changes on no eld B with E ⊂ B ⊆ A, then your subjective probability measure at time t should be Pr Pr→Pr (·) : A → ,
Jerey revision satises the principle of categorical matching, because it is assumed that propositions with extreme probabilities keep their extreme probabilities. If we start with a regular probability measure, Jerey conditionalization leads to another regular probability measure, provided we update by a regular probability measure. Strict coherence (Shimony 1955) urges us to do so whenever we can (but we can't always).
The ranktheoretic analogue is Update Rule 6.6 (Spohn Revision). If Spohn revision satises the principle of categorical matching (without assuming that propositions with extreme ranks keep their extreme ranks). Furthermore, Spohn revision turns regular ranking functions into regular ranking functions, provided you update by a regular ranking function. The good news is you always can. Field (1978) (see also Garber 1980) for the probabilistic side, and Shenoy (1991) for the ranktheoretic side propose update rules characterizing the evidence as such, independently of the prior degree of belief function.
Update Rule 6.7 (Field Conditionalization) . If Pr (·) : A → is your subjective probability measure at time t and between t and t your subjective F. Huber probabilities on the partition {E i ∈ A : i ∈ N } change with strength α i ∈ (−∞, ∞), where i α i = 0, and your positive subjective probabilities change on no ner partition, then your subjective probability measure at time t should be Pr E i ↑α i (·) : A → ,
Field conditionalization leads from one probability measure to another probability measure. Furthermore, Field conditionalization leads from one regular probability measure to another regular probability measure. Both these things would be dierent if the α i were allowed to equal ∞. As Field (1978: 363) observes, the α i cannot be the values of a probability measure. This is the reason why there is no Field revision. Update Rule 6.8 (Shenoy Conditionalization). If (·) : A → N ∪ {∞} is your ranking function at time t and between t and t your ranks on the partition {E i ∈ A : i ∈ I} change with strength z i ∈ N , where min {z i : i ∈ I} = 0, and your nite ranks change on no ner partition, then your ranking function at time t should be E i ↑z i (·) : A → N ∪ {∞},
Shenoy conditionalization leads from one ranking function to another ranking function, and from one regular ranking function to another regular ranking function. These claims depend on the assumption that the z i are nite. As an aside, note that plain conditionalization results as a limiting (z i → ∞) case of Shenoy conditionalization, whereas it is a special (z i = ∞) case of Spohn conditionalization. The same is true for strict conditionalization in relation to Field and Jerey conditionalization, respectively (Field 1978: 365) .
Shenoy conditionalization is evidence oriented in the sense that
Note that there is no loss of generality in restricting the parameters z i to N rather than the set of integers Z. A change in the rank of E ∈ A with strength −z, z ∈ N , is nothing but a change in the rank of E ∈ A with strength z. More importantly, as Shenoy (1991: 173) observes, in contrast to the probabilistic case, where the α i cannot be described as the values of a probability measure, the z i now can be described as the values of a ranking function. Hence there also is Update Rule 6.9 (Shenoy Revision). If (·) : A → N ∪{∞} is your ranking function at time t and between t and t your ranking function on the eld E ⊆ A changes by (·) : E → N ∪ {∞}, and the nite part of your ranking function changes on no eld B with E ⊂ B ⊆ A, then your ranking function at time t should be ↑ (·) : A → N ∪ {∞},
Shenoy revision satises the principle of categorical matching and leads from one ranking function to another. However, in order to assure this we have to make some cosmetic adjustments for the case of m = ∞, or ruling it out by at. Alternatively, we could assume the new ranking function to be regular. In any case, Shenoy revision with two regular ranking functions gives rise to another regular ranking function.
Just as Jerey and Field conditionalization are interdenable, so are Spohn and Shenoy revision (and hence conditionalization):
There is the Lewis-Teller Dutch Book Argument for strict conditionalization (Teller 1973) , and there is a Dutch Book Argument for Jerey conditionalization (Armendt 1980) . What about a Consistency Argument for plain and Spohn conditionalization as well as Spohn and Shenoy revision?
Consistency Theorems for Conditionalization and Revision
An agent's conditional degree of entrenchment for a proposition A conditional on a proposition E is dened as the number of independent and mp-reliable information sources providing the conditional information A given E that it takes for the agent to give up her conditional disbelief that A given E. If the agent does not conditionally disbelieve A given E to begin with, it does not take any conditional information source providing the conditional information A given E to make her stop conditionally disbelieving A given E.
In this case her conditional degree of entrenchment for A given E is 0. If no nite number of conditional information sources is able to make the agent stop conditionally disbelieving A given E, her conditional degree of entrenchment for A given E is ∞. To receive the conditional information A given E is, among others, to receive the conditional information B given E, for any proposition B ⊇ A. To independently and mp-reliably receive n times the conditional information A given E is, among others, to independently and mp-reliably receive n times the conditional information B given E. It is not to independently and mp-reliably receive m times the conditional information B given E, for some m = n. If you tell me that the temperature today at noon will be 93 • Fahrenheit provided it does not rain, you also tell me that the temperature today at noon will be between 90 • and 96 • Fahrenheit provided it does not rain. The reliability with which I get the second conditional information is exactly the same as the reliability with which I get the rst conditional information (it is still you who tells me so). The dierence between the two is a dierence in conditional informational content. and n i = 0 for E i = W ) in the sense that her new entrenchment function on A is such that (E i ) = n i , and her nite ranks change on no ner partition. Then the following are equivalent:
1. The agent updates according to Spohn conditionalization.
2. Every possible current or future belief set (unconditional or conditional on some E i ) based on is consistent and deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense.
3. The agent's degrees of entrenchment conditional on each E i remain unaected, and is a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function.
Conditional degrees of entrenchment are assumed to be numbers from N ∪ {∞}. 2. Every possible current or future belief set (unconditional or conditional on some E i ) based on is consistent and deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense.
Conditional degrees of entrenchment are assumed to be numbers from N ∪ {∞}.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2: If the agent updates according to Spohn revision, her entrenchment function after adopting * on E is → * . → * is a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function if is. So each current belief set (unconditional or conditional on some E i ) based on → * is consistent and deductively closed in the nite / countable / complete sense. Moreover, the same is true for every possible future belief set (unconditional or conditional on some E i ). For, by assumption, evidence comes in form of a new entrenchment function on a subeld of the original eld, and Spohn revision leads from one nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function to another. 2 ⇒ 3: Suppose the agent adopts as her entrenchment function on A after adopting * on E. If is no ranking function, we proceed as in the proof of theorem 4.2.
By assumption, there is no proper supereld of E on which the positive part of changes between t and t . So for any A ∈ A and all
Now suppose the agent changes her degrees of entrenchment conditional on some E i . Then
But then E i ⊆ A, and so Bel (·|E i ) is not deductively closed in the nite, countable, or complete sense contradicting the assumption that is a ranking function. (1.2) If (A | E i ) = n > 0, we have the following situation: ||| 0 (A | E i ) = n (A | E i ) = n > n Assume the agent receives evidence equivalent to being given the conditional information A given E i by at least n, but fewer than n independent and mp-reliable information sources. The resulting conditional entrenchment functions n * (· | E i ) and n * (· | E i ) after independently and mp-reliably receiving n * ∈ [n, n ) times the conditional information A given E i are such that n * (A | E i ) = (A | E i )−n * = 0 and n * (A | E i ) = (A | E i )−n * > 0. Now we have the following situation: ||
Hence A ∈ Bel n * (·|E i ) and A ∈ Bel n * (·|E i ) , and so E i ⊆ A. Therefore Bel n * (·|E i ) is not deductively closed in the nite, countable, or complete sense contradicting the assumption that is a ranking function.
But then E i ⊆ A, and so Bel (·|E i ) is inconsistent in the nite, countable, and complete sense if it is deductively closed in the nite, count-able, or complete sense contradicting the assumption that is a ranking function.
(2.2) If (A | E i ) = n > 0, we have the following situation: ||| 0 (A | E i ) = n (A | E i ) = n > n Assume the agent receives evidence equivalent to being given the conditional information A given E i by at least n, but fewer than n independent and mp-reliable information sources. The resulting conditional entrenchment functions n * (· | E i ) and n * (· | E i ) after independently and mp-reliably receiving n * ∈ [n, n ) times the conditional information A given E i are such that n * (A | E i ) = (A | E i )−n * > 0 and n * (A | E i ) = (A | E i )−n * = 0. Now we have the following situation: ||
n * (·|E i ) and A ∈ Bel n * (·|E i ) , and therefore E i ⊆ A. But then Bel n * (·|E i ) is inconsistent in the nite, countable, and complete sense if it is deductively closed in the nite, countable, or complete sense contradicting the assumption that is a ranking function. 3 ⇒ 1: Suppose the agent adopts the nitely / countably / completely minimitive as her ranking function on A after adopting * on E. By assumption we have for all E i : (· | E i ) = (· | E i ). As (· | E i ) = Conditional degrees of entrenchment are assumed to be numbers from N ∪
{∞}.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2: If the agent updates according to Shenoy revision, her entrenchment function after revision by * is ↑ * . Subject to cosmetic adjustments, ↑ * is a nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function if is. So each current belief set (unconditional or unconditional on some E i ) based on ↑ * is consistent and deductively closed in thenite / countable / complete sense. Moreover, the same is true for every possible future belief set (unconditional or conditional on some E i ). For, by assumption, evidence comes in form of an additional entrenchment function on some subeld of the original eld of propositions, and, subject to cosmetic adjustments, Shenoy revision leads from one nitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function to another. 2 ⇒ 3: Suppose the agent adopts as her entrenchment function after revision by * on E. If is no ranking function, we proceed as in the proof of theorem 4.2.
F. Huber
ceiving n * ∈ [n, n ) times the conditional information A given E i are such that n * (A | E i ) = (A | E i )−n * > 0 and n * (A | E i ) = (A | E i )−n * = 0. Now we have the following situation: || n * (A | E i ) ≤ 0 n * (A | E i ) > 0 Hence A ∈ Bel n * (·|E i ) and A ∈ Bel n * (·|E i ) , and therefore E i ⊆ A. But then Bel n * (·|E i ) is inconsistent in the nite, countable, and complete sense if it is deductively closed in the nite, countable, or complete sense contradicting the assumption that is a ranking function. 3 ⇒ 1: Suppose the agent adopts the nitely / countably / completely minimitive as her ranking function on A after revision by * on E. By assumption we have for all E i : (· | E i ) = (· | E i ). As (· | E i ) = ↑ * (· | E i ) and ↑ * (E i ) = (E i ) + * (E i ) − min { (E i ) + * (E i ) : i ∈ I} = (E i ), this entails ↑ * (A) = (A).
These theorems allow us to drop the temporary assumption of theorem 4.2 that updating leads from one ranking function to another. Together the theorems of section 4 and 7 show that the package consisting of the axioms and the update rules of the ranking calculus are nothing but a diachronic version of consistency and deductive closure.
Conclusion
According to the Consistency Argument, to violate the ranking axioms is to possibly have beliefs that are not both consistent and deductively closed. Most likely it is not epistemically defective to have such beliefs. What is more likely to be epistemically defective is to knowingly have such beliefs. The ranking axioms assume the agent to be logically omniscient on the object level. Among others, this assumption shows up by taking propositions rather than sentences or other representations to be the objects of belief. If we extend this assumption to the meta level so that it includes propositions about one's own epistemic state # , the distinction between inconsistency and known inconsistency breaks down: to have beliefs that are inconsistent or not deductively closed is to knowingly have such beliefs. Given a link between degrees of disbelief and degrees of entrenchment, the normative force of the Consistency Argument is then proportional to how odd one takes # I am grateful to Eric Swanson for pointing out to me that there are two levels with respect to which the agent can be logically omniscient, and that the distinction between inconsistency and known inconsistency breaks down only if we assume the agent to be logically omniscient on the meta level. the possibility of knowingly having beliefs that are not both consistent and deductively closed.
